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Form and Content in Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes:
Rhetoric, Philosophy, Inconsistency and Invalid Argument in some Greek Thinkers

(B 11) and Palamedes (B 11a)1 are among the longest pieces
ed in Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.
We
includ
of continuous prose
a
ow
nsiderin
c
e
wri
y
sion
c
o
t
h
merit
g
who
r
of
have here a �are opportunit
s in lu
Gorgias, it is
in Diels-Kranz develops an argument over a number of pages.
Gorgias' Helen

true·, is a rhetorician; and though he has some claim to be regarded as a soph
ist or-Presocratic :philosopher also (see especially BJ), rhetoric2 has evident
The extent of the contri
ly much to contribute to the Helen and Palamedes.
first
the
of
subject
primary
of my paper.
part
the
indeed
is
I shall
bution

inquire whether Gorgias in the Helen indulges in rhetorical flourishes in which
form takes precedence over content;

whether on" the other hand Gorgias'

general

philosophical position supplies the content of this work and furnishes premisses
from which conclusions axe drawn for Helen's benefit,

the rhetoric furnishing

argument.

(21):

no more than a pleasing mode of presentation; or whether a case is being argued,
and language manipulated, ad hoc, the rhetoric substituting for logic a.�d valid
Gorgias himself terms the Helen

a

Eaignion

sider the meaning of the word in the light of my discussion.

the Palamedes in less detail,

I shall briefly con

I shall discuss

and consider whether the presuppositions of the

.Helen and Palamec.es are inconsistent with one another.

Subsequently,

I shall

raise the q.uestionwhether inconsistency is per � a mark of a rhetorician at

this period, or whether similar inconsistencies may be found in other writers
I shall also consider to· what extent

'who are philosophically more respectable.
Gorgias' presuppositions,

Greeks in early Greece;

and inconsistencies,

are shared with non--philosophical

and very bri�fl.y indicate some long-standing worries
of my own about the study o:f Presocratic philosophers.
There is much of interest in the introduction to the Helen; but I have no
space to discuss it here, and shall begin at (6), where Gorgias sets out four
possible reasons or causes for Helen's going to Troy with Paris: she did what
she did either (a) as a result of the wishes of Chance or the plans of the gods
·

or the decrees of Necessity or

(b)

because she was carried off by force or

because she was persuaded by words (logoi) o·r

love.

( d)

We might perhaps provisionally grant that Gorgias had furnished

list of possible reasons

or

(c)

because she was smitten with
a

full

causes (but see below),J and e..<pect him to demon

strate that Helen was influenced by (b), or possibly (a), since (b) is certain
ly, and (a) possibly, a valid defence.
Gorgias, howev,er, undertakes to show
that, no matter which of the four was the reason, Helen should be exonerated
from blame.

He offers four argmnents or groups of arguments,

reason or cause.
Argtunent 1.

Suppose Chance,

decre�Helen's journey.

prevented by the weaker.

one for each

Necessity or the gods desired,

planned or

By nat ure (pephuke) the stronger (kreisson) is not
No; the weaker is ruled and led (sg;esthai) by the

stronger.
God (a term which evidently includes Chance and Necessity) is kreisson
If then
than a human being in might, wisdom, and their other characteristics.
one should ascribe the causation (or the guilt, aitia) to Chance and God, one
should absolve Helen from her bad reputation.

I shall discuss later whether these pleas are novel.4

note that the argument seems to rest primarily on causality,

For the moment I

with the will of

the divine powers mentioned acting as a cause.
The stronger can compel the
actions of the weaker.
The argument is logically presented: its acceptability
is likely to vary from culture to culture.
However, not only logic is employed,
nor

is causality alone invoked.

Kreisson does not simply mean

serves as one of the comparatiyes of

also in wisdom or cleverness, (sophia

�

athos,

'stronger':

it

'good', so that one may be kreisson

and other characteristics.

The wiser

or
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persuaded her (or her p su c he).
Now. in (9-11) logo s
The rest of (8) elaoorates.
does not stand as the subject of a t rans it ive verb; and when it doe s so again in
(12) Gorgias feels himself able to interpre t 'persuade d ' as 'compelled.' The

wo rd-o rder and syntax of the sentence translated above are a step on the way.
Logoi are the agency of p ers u as i on; but they appear merely in a pr eposit io nal
phrase.
To perceive the logoi is essent ial ; but there is no word for perception.

'Other people's pragmata and bodies' is closely p a ral l el e d with 'its own pathema',
as if t he pragmata and bo dies directly caused the pathema.7 The causali ty of
logo s is the theme of G o rgi as' paragraph; but he is moving caut ious ly , step by
step, to the point where he feels able to assert it; and initi al ly that a pragma
should cause a pathema, in the relevant sense of pathema ( whic h I shall di sc uss
in a m omen t) seems prima facie more likel y -- without argument; and none is forth
comi ng -- than that a logos should.
(I shall argue that there is a similar device
in (12).)
Rhetorical sl eight of hand is most apparent he re; but is philosophy also
p re s e nt?
I s Gorg i as, by using pas chei n in (7) of physical suffering, h ere of 8
·

the psuche,

giving 'to this subjective emotion an objective, physical reality?'

I h av e no doubt that Gorgias did not clearly di s tinguish the material from the
non-material: I suspect Pl ato to have bee n the first to do so.
That being so,
the objective physical reality is likely to have been assumed unchallenged. What
is more imp ort ant for G orgi as ' case is to rep res e nt the events as a causal. sequenc·e.
For t h is purpose he employs the range o f usage of ria s ch ein, pathema.
Paschein may
mean s imp l y 'happ e n to, ' as whe n used of th e Nile in Hdt. 2. 20; and at least in
sli ghtl y later Greek nathema may mean 'emotion, affec ti on ' when used with psuche
( Xen. Cyr. 3 .1.17) or even of the experie nce of the nsuche in e xe rcis ing 12hronesis
(P la to Phd. 79d), which is not an emotion and not p as s ive .
In the Plato and Xenopho n
·

cited, pathema makes no philosophical point;

but of course Gorgias chooses paschein

But the argument seems to me to be based
and pathema for the p ass iv ity implied.
not o n a coherent phil oso phical position but on a rhet o ri cal transference of paschein
from one context to another.
I shall argue in favor of my view by pointing out that
such transferences are characteristic of the design of the H el en .
Inspired ( entheoi)
in c an ta
Gorgias then ( 10) turns to another type of logos.
tions through the medium of· logoi induce pleasure, banish pain; for the power
( dunamis, cf. dunastes and dunatai ) of the i nc ant ati on consorting with t he opinion
of the mind (p s uche ) charms ( thelgein ) it, persuades ( 'Peithein ) it and changes
(methistanai) it by w i tch craft
Once again the prese nce of deity is alluded to
( e nth eoi , 'with gods in them': cf. A rgum e nt 1), and power is set in the foreground.
But is the 'for' clause a philosophical explanation of what precedes?
S ur el y not,
in th e sense of an explanation drawing on a coherent theory: 'the dunamis of the
It explains
in cant ati on consorting
•
can really be read only as a metaphor.
nothing; but it does make 'power' the subject of the three transitive verbs. This
e'P at hm in ( 9).
Wh at Gorgias really offers
is a stro nger expression than· uathema
is a verbal 'slide, ' in which one word is r epl ac ed by an alleged s ynonym which
in fac t has different implications. Thelgein, 'charm,' is the appropriate term
. with incantations and other mag ic acts.
It has associations of binding with spells
.

•

•

•

•

against the will:

Circe in Odyssey

•

.

10 ( 291, 318, J26)

could have t he lge_i,g Odysseus

with her magic arts and turned him into an animal had he not had a protective herb.

G orgia s then writes peithein,

implyi ng -- without proof -- that thelgein,

used to inst i l pleasure and banish pain,

is pers uasi on.

when

He evidently hopes that

' persuas ion '
will be endowed with all the associations of th el g ein , though the
examples of thelgein gi ven are solely of imparting p l e a s ure and removing pain.

Gorgias needs to sho w that persuasion not me rely can impart emotions will y.;.. nill y, .
but that the emotions will issue in action willy-nilly; .and he h as really demon
strated neither, even for thelge i n and certainly not for p ei thei n .
Gorgias then
uses methistanai, 'change.'
In a weak sense of 'change' the move is harmless, since
presumably all data,

if they are to be perceived by the mind, must produce some

-4-

changes therein; but Gorgias needs a strong sense of 'change' -- 'producing nec
essary changes in the psuche which necessarily issue in act�on.' He has offered
no proof that such a sense of 'change' is appropriate; he has merely contrived
by skilful use of language to suggest that it is. Once again we have a trico+on,

meth i s t anai : a rhetorical device frequently resorted to
neithein
Its stylistic
for emphasis, rhetorical fullness or other stylistic reasons.
function might well help to conceal that it is here used also for sleight of hand

thelgein

•

•

•

••

•

in the content of the argument.
In (11) Gorgias makes the point that if everyone had knowledge of past, pre
But as it is, most
sent and future, the effect of logos would not be the same.
'And opin
people in most circumstances have to resort to opinion as counsellor.
ion, which is hazardous and unreliable, involves those who employ it in successes

which are hazardous and unreliable.' Is there here allusion to a doctrine, like
It seems not. Gorgias is making
the Socratic, that no-one goes against knowled.ge?
the common-sense point that if all the facts, including the future, were known,
presumably Helen would have acted differently had
The argument is a digression, and it
she known the outcome of the Trojan War.
Not all opinions result from persuasion; to 'make
does not help Gorgias' case.

people would act differently:

a mistake'

which is a moral error is not normally regarded as excusable in Greek;
Furthermore, (11) im

and Gorgias offers no reasons for a different evaluation.

plies that there are actions which are not the effects of external causes; which
reveals other flaws in the alleged comprehensiveness of his defense.
I shall
return to this point later.9

The opening words of (12), which are hopelessly corrup t, might have contain
ed some attempt to show the relevance of (11); but none of the proposed emenda
tions has this effect, or even uses the term 'opinion.' Gorgias returns to the
argument of (10), according to the emendations, at the beginning of (12); and
visibly does so in the transmitted text at the end of (12): 'for logos which -per
suaded her -osuche cr) m:p el led (anankazein) the -psuche whfoh it persuaded to agree
with (p e i the sth a i ) what was said and to acquiesce in what was done. The one who
persuaded committed an injustice in using compulsion, whereas the one who was
persuaded, inasmuch as she was compelled by logos, is wrongly blamed.'
Gorgias
now finds himself able to say that logos persuaded the psuche and to slide immedi
ately to 'compelled.' The form of words is more explicit than in (9): Gorgias
advances one step at a time.
Gorgias' hearers may find it easier to accept that
logos compelled Helen's psuche than that logos compelled Helen, since both logos
and psuche are 'psychic'; though he has of course justified neither.
He now uses
the fact that logos is masculine, psuche feminine.
He writes ho � � neisas,
'the one who persuaded,' which might refer either to Paris or to the logos, while
he peistheisa, 'the one who was persuaded,' might refer either to Helen or to her
psuche.
Sinc e it is not Helen's psuche, but Helen, that is being blamed, the
hearer is likely to interpret the se co nd p art ic ip l e as referring to Helen, the
first to Paris, with the result that it is suggested that Helen was compelled by
Paris using logos as an instrument: a proposition nrima facie even less easy to
accept than that her psuche was compelled by logos.
There is verbal dexterity
also in peithesthai.
Since it is the passive of neithein, if A peithei B, B
peithetai; but the range of usage of peithesthai with the dative spans
'be
persuaded, obey, trust in': the word may suggest that logos compelled Helen not
merely to be persuaded but to trust in and obey what was said. Once again, I
see skilful rhetoric here, but little philosophical theory.

In (13) Gorgias speaks of persuasion added to logos 'moulding (tunousthai)
the mind as it wishes': the strongest statement yet, and one totally unproved as
yet.
He adduces as evidence here the arguments of the cosmologists which can
take away one opinion and implant (energazesthai) anothe r ; forensic arguments,10

in which one argument delights and persuades a crowd not because its statements
are true but because it is composed with skill; and philosophical debates, in
which quickness of wit can be seen readily making (poiein) opinion easily changed

!�
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( eumetabolon }.

I. see no philosophical theory here ; and the evidence falls far

He adduces examples of persuasion: he needs to
short of proving Gorgias' point.
n are instances of necessary, compulsory
persuasio
argue that all instances of
that argument, but you need not have been/
by
aded
persu
persuasion, that 'you were
nonsense.
(cf. Aristotle's remarks in EN 1110 a
is
ve'
si
the argumen t is not persua
of
4
and
3
ments
the Helen.)
Argu
to
There is less rhetori
29, which are relevant
and
(8))
in
(also
not
do
sthai
noiein
compare with some
cal skill here: energaze

Possibly, however, the statement that the cosmologists
earlier rhetorical effects.
and obscure to a:ppear before the eyes of doxa'
incredible
is
what
' cause (12oiein)
'The eyes of doxa' is a much more unusual
t.
n
gume
r
a
fourth
the
to
points forward
expression in Greek than is ' t h e mind's eye' in English, and presumably was chosen
with some purpose.
In the light of the fourth argument Gorgias could have elabor

ated the phrase into an assertion that speech presents to the mind images over whi c h
we have no more control than over the manner in which what we see presents itself
As we
There is no more than a hint here, but it may prepare for {15 ff.).
to us.
by
step
step.
advancing
is
have seen, Gorgias

an analogy is drawn between the effects of logos and those of pharmaka,
Different
pharmaka drive out different humors from the body: some c ure, some
'drugs.'·
kill. Similarly, some logoi cause grief, some joy, some fear, some boldness, while

In

(14)

others ' through some harmful persuasion "drug" ( l)h_armakeuein) and b ewit ,�h (goeteuein)
the mind.'
Once again, Gorgi as is try ing to equate peithein wit h a causal sequence,
for the effect of a drug does not depend on the patient's choice:

follows irrespective of the patient's wish.

I see none.

cure or death

Is there a philosophical theory here?

Gorgias draws an analogy between the effects of logoi on the 'PSUche

and drugs on the body,

and in justification simply says 'for drugs have effects
b1 c etc ., while logoi have effects k, 1, m, etc.' . No proof is offered that
the effects are produced in any analogous way: this is a mere petitio ')Jrincipii.

.a,

Any conviction must be produced by rhetori c,

by skilled choice of words.

word-order in discussing the effects of l o go s may be intended to help
first two examples, grief and joy,

second pair, however,
retreat and advance.

the relevant actions.

his

Gorgias'
ca se .

do not suggest specific types of action;

fear and boldness,

the

The

dispose the mind towards types of action:

(Gorgias has not attempted to prove that the· emotions cause
He might have used the arguments of

may be advancing step by step.)

15

ff.:

once again he

He concludes with the exarrrple of persuasion ( aft e r
using pleasure and pain as earlier examples, as in 10), and reintroduces a word from

(10),

'bewitched,'

where he h(),s already argued for a causal sequence.
The use of
The word takes up
is rhetorically skilful.

pharma keuein together with 'bewitched'

e arli e r in (1.4).
Now :E_harmaka may denote both what we should distinguish
(Being unaware how
as medicinal drugs and magical means of affecting others.11
either worked, the Greeks did not distinguish clearly at this period between natural

;pharmaka

and supernatural causat ion.)
(chumos),

Pharmaka in (14), closely associated with 'humors'
a scientific terrn,12 predominantly suggests scientific medicine; but

pharmakeuein, whi c h has the same range as

with

J2!!armaka, when

b rought

into association

both go et e uei n and the earlier use of J2harmaka, readi ly calls to mind the full

range of usage, and binds together the argument of ( 14) with that of ( 10) , where,
The rhetoric is skil

Gorgias hopes, a causal sequence has already been conceded.

ful; of philosophical theory, or of valid philosophical argument, there is none.
We may note once again the use of a term (goeteuein) to cross-refer to an earlier
part of the speech in order to suggest the existence of an argument: it seems to

be a Gorgianic device.
G orgias sums up his third argument by claiming to have
proved that if Helen was persuaded by logos, she did not do wrong but was tmfortun-

ate

(atuchein).

She was not the agent but the

patient.

.

.

The fourth argument, designed to exonerate Helen if it was love
Argument 4.
that 'did' all this, takes a similar line.
(Note the immediate ascription of agency,

prattein, to love: Gorgias' confidence is increasing.)

What we see does not have.

the nature we wish it to have, but whatever it chances to ha� e ;

and t hrough sight
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plicitly discussed, but possibly hinted at in Argument J, (11); it came by the
snares of Chance, (Argument 1), not the plans of the mind and by the n ecess i t ies
of love, not the devices of art.
'Necessities' once again introduces the idea
of compulsion by a stronger.
Is there philosophy here?
What is said about sight is evidently comn atibl e
with the view ascribed to Gorgias by Plato (Meno 76 A ff.) that col o r is an

effluence from objects, fitting the p a ssa ges(:)f"the eyes, since it a sse rt s a flow
from obj ec ts . into the perceiver; but the argument of (1.5)ff. rests on observable
h'l.Illlan behavior, would be compatible with many theor i e s of perception, an d woulcl
be rendered no more valid by any theory that stopped short, as Gorgias' does, of
claiming more th an that certain results 'of'ten' follow.
There is curious Greek·

here: it seems strange to say that ' si gh t is throvm into confusion and confuses,'
that it 'engraves imag es in the mind' and that Helen's eye was pleased and then
There may be a philosoph i c al theory; but it is
c aused effects in her psuche.

worth observing that similar ph ras e s occur in t rage dy .
Opsis, here translated
' si gh t , ' is a word whose range spans ' si ght , appearance, face, eyes . '
The connota
tion of the word perhaps renders it easier to write th at opsis is thrown int o con
fusion, disturbed, by terror.
Sim ilarly , Ele:ctra says to Orestes that his � ·
('eye, face , etc.' ) is thrown into con fusion ( tar attein ) , when Orestes' experiences
have driven him mad (Eur. O rest. 253).
H ade s in Aesch. Eum. 27.5 is said to watch
over everything �c.\.r'-'lf"q'"'i'
4·(-'i:i.1{ :J
'with.a mind that records on tablets.•
A;;::nn,
the Guard in Soph. Ant. 317 asks 'Are you p ai ned in your ear s or in your �uche?'
The idea is used somewhat differently; but the distinction drawn betwe en effects .
in ears and psuche is comprehensible in the ab s ence o f any p hil osophi c al theory,13
(The date of Antigone makes it impossible to suppose the lin e affected by Gorgias'
famous v is i t to Athens. )
T h ere might be a ph ilo soph i c al theory here nonetheless;

after all, metaphor is sometimes a source for philsophical theory, and I shall argui
below that there are p r e c edent s for some of Gorgias' causal expressions in earlier
G r eek .
It remains true, however, that the the o ry does not materially assist the
argume nt , which rests sha!dly on empirical obs erv a tio n -- extrapolated -- and
rheto r ical sleight of hand.
It is worth noting that Gorgi as ' four arguments do not exclude all possibility
of condemning Helen.
In 11 the possibillty of. moral error arising out of mistake
about one's best i.nterests was mentioned, though not ·very clearly; and now in 19
we have ment ion of 'the plans o f intellect' and 'the devices of art' as po ssible
sources of action which are not relevant to Helen's case.
( Gorgi a s does not ex
pla i n why they are not relev ant ; and this is of course a serious flaw in his argu
ment. )
If my analysis is correct, Gorgias is throughout man ip ul at ing lan guag e with
great rhetorical skill to prove a case ad hoc.
He is not s e t t in g out a philosophi
cal theory h eld on other grounds, and drawing from it concl us io n s which serve to
acquit H e len .
(Nor is he indulging in rh eto r ical flourishes for the:i.r own sake:
langua ge is manipulated in a very purpo s e ful m ann e r . ) Gorgias' con cern is to acquit
Helen, and he draws on all hi s resources of ingenuity to construct a case for so
In (8) ff. and (15) ff. he begins from empirical ob serv at ion , drawing from
doing.
it conclusio ns which go far beyond what is j u st i fied , but demand no c o he r e nt theory,
and invoke none.
The motive power of the argument s is v erbal dexterity sustained
over the whole work: I have no te d the m ann er in which G o rg i a s uses wo r d s and phrases
to allude and cross-refer from one argument to ano ther in o rd er to support one point
-- not by argument, but by v erbal association -- with a point he claims to h ave
( No te how he carefully set s the two less
is go ing to 'prove' later.

proved, or

controversial defences firs t , and reverses the order (20) when all are 'proved,'
so that the more difficult proofs may be thrust i nto the foreground. )
The argu. ments of the Helen can be understood without reference to a p h ilo soph i cal theory.
That they would be val id only if a particular type

of

held does not prove t hat Gorgia� held such a theory.

ph il osop h ic al theory were

The structure and method of
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On the basis of the arguments of the Helen
d id not run away qn a p ar ticu la r occasion
army
t
the
one could draw from the fact tha
different
ci rc umst a nc es , verbal or aural gener
in
(or
the conclusion that the visual
ally) s timu lu s was insufficient to cause fl igh t , and one might add ' to an army of

able person playing no role whatever.

persons so discip l ined and with such a cha ra c t e r ; ' but one

could only argue thus
after the event, for one could not forecast the effects of a visual/aural presenta
tion which in all its i n d i v id ual details could never have occurred before.
Accord
ingly, the arguments of He le n

doe s,

(16) would re nd e r it impossible for Palamedes to arg ue ,

'because I have such and s uch a character, I d id not be hav e in such and
If the arguments of the Hel en are pressed as Gorgias needs to press
such a ma nner. '
them to a chieve the goal of hi s reasoni n g in that s pee ch, the position of the Helen
is s een to be in c ompa t ible with that of the Palamedes.
We may be tempted to con clude that s uch d is crepa n ci es are a mark of the paignion,

as he

i nterp ret ed as a work la ck i n g in s e rio usn ess :

Gorgias, we may s uppose, s imp l y makes

whatev�r a ssu mpt ion s he needs for the argument in hand.
The mean i n g of p a i g n i o n has
been mu ch discussed: it has been comp ared with l u sus in Catullus and p a i n i a in
Phile tas ,

g

to indicate that wo rk s so termed may have been serio usl y and carefully

co m po sed. 1 5

There is of course a difference bet ween poetry and phi loso p hi cal argu

ment: one m ig ht work long and se riously at a poem on a frivolous topi c and produce

an excellent poem; but se ri ous work on the prod uct io n of clever but invalid argu

ments will be differ�iltly evaluated.

Gorgias' seriousness about his skill as a

rhe t ori cia n cannot be d oubt ed ; but, as indeed co n tin ui ng schola rl y debate on the
subject would s ugg e s t ,

I doubt whethe r it can be conclusively demonstrated whe ther
in the Helen to be valid. He may have done so,

or not Gorgias believed his arguments

for these ar e the early days of logic and philo s oph y ; or if he knew that there was
something wrong with the arguments, he ma y not have known what it was.
He is ce rt ai n 
What can be demon
ly not the o n l y Presocratic to arg ue for e xt rem e conclusions.16

s tra te d , however, is that s imilar di sc repan c ies occur, in d iff eren t kinds of work in

which t here is no quas tion of deliberate rhetorical trickery; and to this I now turn
my atten t ion .
For even if the Helen and Palamedes are rhetorical

and contain d i s cre pan c i es,

it doe s not necessarily foll ow that their b ei ng rhetorical is a sufficient explana
tion for the discrepancies.
A rh etori ci an cannot take any presuppositions he ch oos e s :
they m ust a p pe ar plaus ib le to those whom he is trying to convince.
Now though hi s
logos and visual d at a may be novel,

arguments about

to tr a ce action back to causes outside the agent .

Gorgias was no t the first Greek

Action is frequently so character

In a famous and
ized in Homer; and similar l ang ua ge appears in fifth - ce ntu ry writers.
Iliad 19.85 ff.,17 Ag amemnon, havi n g discovered the disastrous

mu c h - d i scuss ed passage,

effects of offending Achilles,

says:

'Often indeed did the Greeks tell me this , and

No; Ze us and moira and th e Fury who walks
But I am not aitios of this.
in ga rkne ss are the cause; for t hey put fierce blindness, ate, i nto my m i n d in the

abused me.

assembly whe n

I

myse i f d ep rived A c hill e s o f h is p ri z e.

But what could I do?

god b ri ngs all th ing s to pas s .'
Ag amemno n ' s beh avior in slighting Achilles is th us ex plained.

Agai n , one may yi el d to one's thumos;

The
in _!_liad 9.109

l{ere -- and n umero us

examples could be cited -- we have ascri ptio ns of cause very similar to t ho s e of

Go rg ia s ' Helen;

and Agamemnon ev�n says that he is not a i t i os.

can be so cha rac te ri z ed,

she is f ree d from blame

(6).

If G o rgia s ' Helen
Occasionally, similar moves

In Iliad 3.164 f., Priam ex cuse s Helen from re sponsi bi lity for
are m a de in Homer.
the war, sa ying 'You are not aitie; in my e yes the g o d s are aitioi, who have stirred

up against me the woeful wa r with the Greek s . '
t io n

is unusual,

in Homer and l ater.

I ndee d ,

But this attitude to d i v i ne causa

Ze us'

com pl a in t , Od ys sey 1.32 ff.
that the

( whi c h is not really req u ire d by the s ituation i n the poe m a t th is po in t) ,

accusations me n b ring ag ai nst
upon themselves

.

t he gods are unjustified since ma nkind b ri ng woe s

hu er m oro n, seems

expressed by Pri&�;

t

�es � gned

as a r� e c io n of the

�

given great promine n ce a nd s ee ms progra mmatic .

expect to be

�

�i nd

':'

of vie

8 and set wher e it is at the beg i nn i ng of the first book, it i s

excused for what he has done:

In Il ia d 19, Agamemnon does not

he offers r e compe ns e to Achill e s, and

-10-

indeed follows his statement that three deiti�s were aitioi with 'I my self (autos)
'
Autos is very emphatic, and expresses Agamemnon's agency

deprived Achilles
very strongly.

.

•

•

In the fifth century it remains unusual to excuse behavior on the grounds that

it was .caused by deity.

There are two recorded instances of Delphi excusing human

agents for actions which, the oracle reveals,

the gods have caused themselves

(the

priestess Timo and Evenius, Hdt. 6.135 and 9.93); but the conclusion that, if a
god caused the action, the human being is not responsible for it, is not usually

drawn. Aeschylus in Agam. 1468 ff. displays a sensitivity· to problems of divine
causation and human responsibility which is not apparent in his earlier plays.19
In the Agamemnon the chorus speaks of the daimon that has fallen on the accursed

house.

The form of expression is common enough; but Clytemnestra unusually tries
Later the chorus speaks of Agamemnon as

to employ it to disclaim responsibility.
'srnitten

•

.

.

by a two-edged weapon wielded by the hand of a wife.'

Clytemnestra

realises that such language ascribes responsibility to her as agent.

She denies

responsibility, claiming that the Alaster, the avenging spirit of the accursed

house, took her shape and killed Agamemnon.

The chorus rejects the defence:

will bear witness that you are anaitios of this murder?

'Who

Yet the avenging spirit

sprung from a father's crime might be a sharer in the deed.'

Even in the extreme case of the accursed house of Greek tragedy, th� accursed
may not appeal to the language of divine causation in order to plead that they are

not to be held responsible for their actions.

The Alastor may be a contributory

cause; but, to quote what I have written e lsewhere, 'while some may be predisposed
to do evil by supernatural agency, none are so predestined.'

choice.

Clytemnestra had a

The gods caused Agamemnon to slight Achilles by sending ate upon him (Iliad

9.115 f., 19.136 f., etc.); and ate is frequently cited in later Greek as influenc
ing action for the worse.
Usually, the ascription to ate furnishes no excuse; and
Dodds seems to be correct in·supposing that it serves primarily to distance the

agent psychologically from the act.20

Agamemnon feels that had not

'something'

prevented it, he would have acted sensibly, with a proper calculation of advantages.
Clytemnestra, in a psychological revulsion from what she has done

for the scene

is psychologically sound; it is not merely a philosophical debate -- feels that
she would not 'herself' have done what has been done.

In earlier Greek, accordingly, it was not uncommon to ascribe the source of

actions, particularly -- but not solely -- actions whose consequences had been, or

might be, disastrous,

to causes outside the agent, or external to the agent's

ego, usually identified with the practical intelligence.

That the agent would other

wise have behaved 'sensibly' is a tacit assumption of this belief:
general determinism of action.

there is no implied

Now Gorgias' Palamedes is denying that he has done

anything wrong; he claims to have acted with the prudence and common sense that would
ensure that he would not commit. treachery in the circumstances.
or been involved in,

Helen has pe�formed,

an important action with disastrous consequences;

has furnished her with a choice .of chains

and Gorgias

of causation beginning outside the

agent.

In this respect the difference between the analysis of Helen's situation and that

of Palamedes is traditional.

I have noted that even in the Helen it is conceded -- or seems to be conceded;

but see below -- that not all actions are externally caused, that there is no asser
tion of a universal determinism of action; and this too i.s traditional.
Gorgias

departs from the mainstream of Greek tradition partly by the rhetorical ingenuity

with which he argues for and elaborates his causal chains , but more importantly by
his insistence that the causal chains furnish grounds for exonerating Helen from

blame.
It is at this point that the contradictions between the Helen and the
Palamedes become apparent.
So long as the causal explanation furnished psychologi-

. cal relief, but not an excuse, it was not important to determine criteria for the
class of actions to which the causal explanation was relev·ant:

as we have seen,

..

.

-11-

Agamemnon in the Iliad can cite three deities-as external causes, and say emphati
cally that he himse l f did the deed, all within the space of a few lines.
In these
circumstances it is comp ar ative ly unimpo rtant whether or not the causal explana 
tion is invoked in any particular case.
Gorgias, however, in the Helen has furnis h 

ed causal explanations which are intended to ex cuse , and which could be applied, so
far as I can see, to any misdeed whatever.
Gorgias may allude to miscalculations
of interest, to the plans of intellect and the devices of art; but one can always
say of any action 'I did this because... '; and if the agent wished to obtain or
avoid something (as presumably he did) then at least Argument 4 will be available
to excuse him.
Furthermore, good actions have motives too: Argument 4 could furnish
a causal explanation for all actions which do not fall under Arguments 1, 2 or 3.
A uni versal determinism of action could easily be 'generated from what is said in
the Helen; and such a determinism is not consistent with the Palamedes.
Gorgias may have failed to realise all the implications of his arguments in
the Helen: he is arguing a case for one important action of one important person,
and does not overtly generalise his findings.

He does not say explicitly -- and
it would have been shocking to Greek sentiment -- that armies which run away are
not to be held responsible for their, actions.
Further, since Paris was presumably
under the influence of eros in his behavior towards Helen he should, under the terms

of Argument 4, be absolved from blame; but Gorgias does not wish to draw this con
(7, 12).
I conclude that Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes owe much more to rhetoric than

clusion

to p hilosophy , but also that each draws on certain assumptions about behavior and

causation which date back at least as

far

as Homer.

Gorgias was not taking up

different.positions in different speeches with conscious sophistry, but in each

case elaborating positions which would have been familiar to the Greeks of his day.
Nor is it impossible for an acknowledged philosopher to hold that wrongdoing

is involuntary, right-doing voluntary. Aristotle _1.rgues against the position (EN
1110b9 ff.), defining action done under compulsion as action whose first cause-.
lies outside the agent ( ct
).
The definition seems unexception
able; but Aristotle is aware that it might be argued that actions performed to ob
tain what is pleasant or kalon are involuntary, since these objects are outside
the agent and exert force to compel him (anankazein, cf. Helen _(17) with cross
reference to (12)). Aristotle replies that such a theory renders all action in
voluntary, since the desire for what is pleasant or kalon actuatesall men in
all their actions; and no-one, ·Aristotle is confident, would accept any theory
(Gorgias, as I said above, seems not to have realised
which had such consequences.
all the
possible consequences of his arguments in .the Helen; and I see no reason
to suppose that he would have welcomed them.) Aristotle adds a further point: actions
done in pursuit of the pleasant or kalon are pleasant, and so cannot be done under
compulsion; and be observes that it would be absurd to take the credit for noble

4 J.:ri.1 ��""fYc."1

actions performed in pursuit of the kalon or pleasant while disclaiming responsibi
lity for bad actions performed for the same motives.

Aristotle's own view is that

actions done under compulsion are not simply those whose first cause lies outside

the agent; the person compelled must have contributed nothing at all; and he holds
that being persuaded, or moved to action by desire for the kalon or pleasant, are

elements of action over which the agent exercises some control.

Helen (force majeure) remains valid, as possibly does Argument 1

Argument 2 of the

in some circumstance s;21

but the practical wisdom of the Palamedes is restored to Arguments 3 and 4 of the
Helen, thereby breaking the chain of causation.

A little later

(EN 1111

a 24

ff.)

Aristotle considers the internal, non-rational

springs of action: thumos and epithumia.

If actions performed under their constraint

are involuntary, then no child or animal will ever act voluntarily.

Once again,

Aristotle is confident that no one would accept a theory with such consequences.
·

He

t hen points out that both good and bad actions may be prompted by thumos or epithumia;
and it would be absurd to claim credit for good actions, .but excuse oneself for bad

.

-12-

He concludes
ones, when the ascribed cause of each group of actions is the same.
are
passions
less
al
human than
not
irration
the
(EN 1111 b 1 ff.): 'It seems that
or
thumos
epithumia
the man's
are
from
result
reason is. Accordingly, actions which
are
these
that
involuntary.'
suppose
actions too.... It is absurd, then, to
The arguments, particu�arly those of 1110 b 9 ff., could have Gorgias for their

However, Gorgias cannot be the
they are especially relevant to Argument 4.
that no-one is voluntarily
held
had
sole target.
More prominent thinkers than he
agathos, notably Socrates
voluntarily
kakos without.also maintaining that no-one is
more enlightened version
a
as
and Plato.22
The Socratic position could be regarded
of Helen (11): if we were not ignorant of our best interests in the full sense of
target:

My concern here is not to discuss the Socratic
the phrase, we should act differently.
position as such, merely to show that discrepancies of the kind found in Gorgias 11
and lla are not confined to rhetors and sophists; and for that purpose a brief dis
cussion of the rather different account of 'no-one is voluntarily kakos' which appears
Timaeus treats the basic stuff of the cosmos as
in the Timaeus will be suitable.
being triangles, a shape from which may be constructed every plane figure and thence
every solid.
Earth, air, fire and water differ because they are constituted of dif
ferent geometric shapes.
God made h�man marrow from primary triangles of the high

est quality, and bound human psuche into it.
He divided the marrow between the head
and the spinal column, the head receiving the divine seed of reason, the other parts
of the psuche being bound into the spinal column.
A psuche so bound to its body may
be affected by it, and some of Timaeus' words (e.g. 86 B) would suggest that psuche
.,

;

is under the control of body.

the condition of the body.

There exist diseases of the psuche which result.from

Madness in the familiar sense of the term is included;

and this is uncontroversially involuntary.

But the greatest diseases of the psuche

are pleasures and pains in excess.

The abundant flow of one substance', resulting

from the open texture of the bones,

is the cause of sexual excess; while bad temper,

rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness and stupidity -- all1diseases1 of the psuche --

are ascribed to the presence of acid and salty phlegms and bitter and bilious humors,

which wander through the body

(86

E)

and 'find no exit but are pent within the body

and blend their vapor with the movement of the psuche and cause all manner of diseases
to the psuche.'

It is wrong, says Timaeus,

to reproach anyone in any of these con

ditions as if he were voluntarily bad: no-one is voluntarily kakos

(86

D-E).

The

kakos is so as a result of the unskilled nurtureof his body, and the condition is

universally detested by its possessors, and occurs against their will.
Nowhere else in Plato do we find an explanation of human behavior in such mechan
istic terms.

One might expect to find an explanation of arete in similar terms, for

the p�uche seems entangled in a nexus of causes over which it has no control.
consider the following

(87

B):

But

'Furthermore, when men are in such an evil condition

(kakos), and the political constitutions are kakai and speech in the cities, both in

private and in public, is kakos, and when lessons which would cure these conditions

are nowhere learnt from childhood, as a result of this those of us who are kakoi

become kakoi on account of two altogether involuntary causes.

We must always regard

the parents as responsible for the situation rather than the children and the nurses
rather than those in their care; yet each of us must endeavor,
to flee kakia and pursue the opposite by means of his motive,

so far as in him lies,
practices and studies.

The Timaeus is a work of philosophy, not composed by a sophist or a rhetor.

1·

The

speech of Timaeus is presumably to be. taken seriously, even if the account is only
'probable'

(440,

etc.).

Yet the speaker does not consider the possibility -- indeed,

the necessity, in terms of the account of kakia given above -- that the bad parents
and nurses are involuntarily bad, but is prepared to find fault with them;

just as

Gorgias does not consider that his causal explanations for Helen's behavior, partic
ularly in Argument

4,

could be used to excuse Paris too.

Again, despite the far

reaching explanation of temperaments and behavior in mechanistic terms,
adults to flee kakia by their own endeavors.

Plato adjures

It may be argued that this position

need not be self-contradictory; but it requires more defense than it receives in.the

'
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